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Abstract
This paper studies internal organization of a firm using an incomplete
contracting approach a` la Grossman-Hart-Moore and Aghion-Tirole.
The two key ingredients of our model are externalities among tasks
that require coordination, and investment in task-specific human cap-
ital. We compare three types of organizational structures: centraliza-
tion where the decision authority for all tasks is given to the party
without task-specific human capital, decentralization where the deci-
sion authority for each task is given to the party with necessary hu-
man capital, and hierarchical delegation where the decision authority
is allocated in a hierarchical fashion. Centralization is optimal when
externalities and the requisite coordination are the main issue in orga-
nization design. Decentralization is optimal if the investment in human
capital is more important. Hierarchical delegation is optimal in the in-
termediate case. We also discuss the optimal pattern of hierarchical
delegation as well as several directions extending the basic model.
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1 Introduction
Hierarchies are ubiquitous in modern corporations. Alfred Chandler’s ac-
count of American corporate history takes us back to the mid-19th century
for the genesis of hierarchical organizations. The victory of the railway over
the waterway transformed the organizational form of American businesses:
“It meant the employment of a set of managers to supervise [these] functional
activities over an extensive geographical area; and the appointment of an
administrative command of middle and top executives to monitor, evaluate,
and coordinate the work of managers responsible for the day-to-day opera-
tions. [...] Hence, the operational requirements of the railroads demanded
the creation of the first administrative hierarchies in American business”
(Chandler, 1977, p. 87). As the organizational operation expanded and the
problem of managerial overload became apparent, the hierarchical struc-
ture evolved further into what has become known as a multi-divisional, or
M-form, organization (Williamson, 1981). The distinctive advantage of an
M-form organization is its scale and scope (Chandler, 1990), which M-form
organizations could achieve by creating steep organizational hierarchies (Ra-
jan and Zingales, 2000). In M-form organizations, corporate headquarters
make key strategic decisions while operating decisions are delegated to profit
centers. Within each profit center, there is further delegation of some deci-
sion rights to middle-level managers, who delegate part of their decision au-
thorities further down the hierarchy. Despite Peter Drucker’s prediction that
future businesses would be modeled on a symphony like Mahler’s Eighth,
where a single conductor leads more than 1,000 participants without any in-
termediaries or assistants, hierarchical organizations still dominate modern
businesses (Leavitt, 2003).
Why are there hierarchies? Under what circumstances do hierarchies
perform better than alternative forms of organizations? This paper offers
an economic rationale for hierarchies from an incentive perspective.1 More
specifically, our focus is on multi-tier hierarchies rather than two-tier hier-
archies that have been studied extensively in the principal-agent literature.
A general conclusion from the existing studies is that centralized organiza-
tions dominate hierarchies unless there are elements that prevent the well-
functioning of centralized organizations.2 That is, we need to look at an
environment in which centralized contracting is costly. In line with the in-
complete contracting approach, this paper focuses on an environment where
the costs of writing ‘complete’ contracts are prohibitively large. Our model
builds upon the property rights literature of Grossman-Hart-Moore (Gross-
man and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995), and the control
rights literature initiated by Aghion and Tirole (1997).
1The management literature adds that hierarchies fulfill our psychological needs for
order and security (Leavitt, 2003).
2This literature is reviewed later in this section.
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The key insight from Grossman and Hart (1986) is that ownership of as-
sets, or the residual control over assets, leads to improved incentives to make
specific investments. The cost of ownership held by one party is the reduced
investment incentives from the other party whose ownership is taken away.
Hart and Moore (1990) extend the Grossman-Hart model into a multiple-
agent, multiple-asset setting where the ownership of physical capital can be
extended to a control over human capital. The focus in Aghion and Ti-
role (1997) is the allocation of authority, or decision rights, within the firm.
Granting formal authority to employees not only improves their incentives
for information gathering necessary for decision making, but also encour-
ages their participation. The cost of giving away formal authority is the
principal’s loss of control. Likewise, we identify the costs and benefits of
different organizational structures when contracts specify only the alloca-
tion of decision rights, and subsequent bargaining over the organization’s
outcome. There are two main ingredients in our model that we draw from
Grossman-Hart-Moore and Aghion-Tirole. As in Aghion-Tirole, we focus
on the allocation of authority within the organization. The authority, as
in Grossman-Hart-Moore, leads to larger ex post bargaining power, which
in turn improves the party’s incentive for specific investment. However,
neither authority nor specific investment is sufficient for an explanation of
hierarchies. An organizational answer would be either complete centraliza-
tion or complete delegation, not an intermediate form such as hierarchy.
We thus add a third ingredient: externalities in decisions that necessitate
coordination within the organization.
To illustrate our main point, consider an organization with three agents,
whom we call the manager, agent A and agent B. There are two tasks called
task A and B. The outcome from each task depends on task-specific deci-
sions and the relevant agent’s input such as, say, human capital. Only agent
A (resp. B) has the necessary input for task A (resp. B). Moreover there are
externalities between the tasks. For example, task A can be product design
for which agent A has expertise while task B can be sales of the product for
which agent B has expertise. Agent A can design a single standard product
at lower costs than several differentiated, more marketable products. The
latter choice will make it easier for agent B to market the products: given
the same level of human capital, agent B’s performance will be better when
products are more marketable. Externalities can run in both directions as
well. For example, the two agents can choose the degree of complemen-
tarities between the products they make.3 The manager plays a potential
role of coordinating decisions for the two tasks. We say ‘potential’ since, in
some organizational structure, the manager’s coordination role may not be
called for. Since the level of human capital investment is each agent’s own
3Although not directly concerned with internal organization of a firm, Che and Hausch
(1999) provide various examples of ‘cooperative’ investments.
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decision, an organizational structure depends on who makes a decision for
each task, which is identified with the authority over the task.
We consider three types of organizational structures. In centralization,
the manager makes decisions for both tasks. In decentralization, each agent
makes a decision for the task he has expertise in, which makes the manager’s
input unnecessary. In hierarchical delegation, the manager makes a decision
for one task while one of the agents plays the role as a ‘middleman’ making
a decision for the other task. As in Grossman-Hart-Moore, the party that
makes a task-specific decision bargains over the ex post outcome from the
task with the agent whose human capital is necessary to complete the task.4
Thus the agent with decision-making authority has bargaining power over
and above what is conferred upon him through his human capital. Then
the costs and benefits of alternative organizational structures become ap-
parent. Centralization can internalize externalities but reduces the agents’
incentives to invest in human capital since the marginal return from their
investment would be shared with the manager. In decentralization, each
agent’s incentive to invest in human capital is higher, but externalities can-
not be internalized since each agent cares only about the outcome from his
own task. An optimal organizational structure is the one that optimally
balances these costs and benefits.
Our main conclusions can be summarized as follows. Centralization be-
comes an optimal organizational structure when externalities and the req-
uisite coordination are the main issue in organization design. On the other
hand, if externalities are not significant relative to the importance of hu-
man capital, decentralization becomes an optimal organizational structure.
Hierarchical delegation emerges as an optimal organizational structure in
the intermediate case. It ‘empowers’ the agent at the middle tier, who has
stronger incentives to invest in his human capital compared to centraliza-
tion, and internalizes externalities to some extent, although the agent at the
bottom tier has the least incentives to invest in human capital. Although it
is intuitive why the intermediate range of coordination benefits is a neces-
sary condition for hierarchy to be optimal, it is by no means trivial to show
that it is also a sufficient condition.
Additional conclusions are drawn regarding the optimal pattern of hi-
erarchical delegation. If the agents are asymmetric in their ability, then
the agent who is more efficient and better motivated through empowerment
should be at the middle tier of the hierarchy. The latter condition stresses
the importance of marginal incentives to invest in human capital. We show,
by an example, that the more efficient agent should not necessarily be at
the middle tier of a hierarchy if his marginal incentives are lower than the
4We focus on the symmetric Nash bargaining solution as in Grossman and Hart (1986)
for the main part of the analysis. Our conclusions are shown to remain intact when we
adopt solution concepts such as the Shapley value as in Hart and Moore (1990).
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other agent. We discuss further the optimal pattern of hierarchical delega-
tion when the externalities are one-sided. In this case, the beneficiary rather
than the benefactor has to be at the middle tier of the hierarchy since the
beneficiary can make a decision that can internalize the externality. In fur-
ther extensions of our basic model, we show that our results are robust to an
alternative bargaining solution such as the Shapley value. Finally, the case
for hierarchical delegation is shown to be weakened if either of the agents has
unlimited expertise or there is a possibility of renegotiation before decisions
are made.
There is ample evidence on how organizational structures change to
tackle the tradeoff between coordination and motivation. As human capital
becomes more and more important relative to inanimate physical capital in
modern corporations, corporate hierarchies tend to become flatter (Rajan
and Zingales, 2000, 2001). Such flattening of hierarchies is more pronounced
in industries with more intensive human capital than those with more in-
tensive physical capital (Rajan and Wulf, 2003).5 The recent move towards
empowerment of employees at lower tiers of the corporate hierarchy is also
more visible in industries such as banking and finance, and high technology.
On the other hand, as corporations face increasingly serious coordination
problems, they tend to switch to a more centralized structure. For exam-
ple, Hewlett Packard underwent substantial changes in its organizational
structure through the 1980s (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p. 547). It had
more or less a multi-divisional structure with each division given consider-
able autonomy so that innovation and creativity could be encouraged. With
introduction of its first personal computer in 1980, the problem of coordi-
nation among divisions became the central organizational issue for Hewlett
Packard. To cope with this problem, Hewlett Packard experimented with
increasing centralization through the 1980s.6
We close this section with a brief review of the relevant literature. There
is an extensive literature on incentive-based explanations of hierarchy.7 For
concreteness, it is useful to call the optimal centralized mechanism without
collusion the second best, and that with the possibility of collusion the third
best.8 Baron and Besanko (1992), and Gilbert and Riordan (1995) establish
5Rajan and Wulf (2003) show that the intensity of physical capital as measured by the
real value of fixed assets per employee is positively and significantly correlated with the
depth of hierarchy in an organization.
6An alternative to centralization in achieving coordination is to foster communica-
tion between divisions as adopted by General Motors and PepsiCo (Alonso, Dessein and
Matouschek, 2008).
7Other strands of literature on multi-tier hierarchy are concerned with the issue of
monitoring and loss of control (Williamson, 1967; Calvo and Wellisz, 1978; Qian, 1994),
or the information-processing capacity of hierarchy (Radner, 1993; Van Zandt, 1999).
Hart and Moore (2005) focus on the allocation of authority within hierarchies but without
the element of incentives.
8They can be also called the collusion-free mechanism and the collusion-proof mecha-
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the equivalence of the second best and a hierarchy when risk-neutral agents
provide complementary inputs to production. McAfee and McMillan (1995)
consider a hierarchy subject to limited liability constraints, showing losses
involved in a hierarchy relative to the second best. In an adverse selection
environment but without limits on communication, Melumad, Mookherjee
and Reichelstein (1995) show that the second-best outcome can be achieved
using a hierarchy and proper sequencing of the hierarchical contracts. Laf-
font and Martimort (1998) further establish the equivalence of the second
best and a hierarchy even when there are limits on communication. An
additional conclusion from Laffont and Martimort is that, with limits on
communication (anonymity of centralized contracts in their model), a hi-
erarchy can dominate the third best. Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004)
generalize the model in Laffont and Martimort to show that hierarchical
delegation is in general strictly dominated by the third best due to dou-
ble marginalization of rents. The equivalence of a hierarchy and the third
best is established in a moral hazard environment by Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m
(1998), and Macho-Stadler and Pe´rez-Castrillo (1998), and in a principal-
supervisor-agent setup by Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and Martimort (2003).
The general conclusion from these studies is that, to have a hierarchy as
an efficient organizational form, there need to be some transactions costs in
using the centralized mechanism.
Although not directly concerned with hierarchies, several studies focus on
the benefits of delegation. Itoh (1992, 1993) shows that, in a multiple-agent
moral hazard environment, the principal can benefit by allowing coalition of
agents, when agents can monitor each other. Dessein (2002) shows that del-
egation of authority can dominate communication of local information when
communication is strategic and the goals of the principal and the agent are
not too disparate. Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008) and Rantakari
(2008) address how organizations can achieve coordination through decen-
tralization and lateral communication of local information. In these studies,
cheap talk communication between division managers is the vehicle through
which coordination is achieved, the benefits of which improve with decen-
tralization. Our paper complements these studies by showing that, in the
absence of such communication, hierarchical decentralization can be another
way to improve coordination relative to complete decentralization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
basic model. Section 3 describes three organizational structures and solves
for equilibrium in each of them. Section 4 compares the three organizational
structures and provides our main dominance results. In Section 5, we dis-
cuss various ways our basic model can be extended. Section 6 concludes the
paper. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
nism, respectively.
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2 The Model
We consider a simple organization that consists of three risk-neutral par-
ties, called manager and agents A and B, whose reservations payoffs are
normalized to zero. There are two projects, called project A and B. Imple-
mentation of project i (i = A,B) requires a decision and agent i’s human
capital. The decision for project A (B, resp.) is denoted by a ∈ A (b ∈ B,
resp.) where A = B ≡ {S,C}. Decision S is selfish in that, compared to
decision C, it leads to a higher return for one project, but a smaller external
benefit for the other project. Decision C is cooperative in that it results in
a lower return for one project, but a larger external benefit for the other
project. Examples of these decisions have been discussed in the previous
section.
Agent i chooses the level of human capital denoted by ei ∈ [0, E], which
incurs cost c(ei). We assume that c′ > 0, c′′ > 0, c′(0) = c(0) = 0, c′(E) =∞
and c(E) <∞. In our basic model, the two agents are assumed symmetric.
We discuss the case of asymmetric agents in Section 5.1. The outcome
from each project is binary and is called success or failure. The success
probability of project n (n = A,B) depends on the level of human capital
chosen by agent n and is denoted by P (en), which satisfies P ′ > 0, P ′′ < 0
and P (e) ∈ (0, 1) for all e ∈ [0, E]. When project A succeeds, its realized
return is given by
h(a) + q(b). (1)
Thus the return from project A is affected not only by decision a but also
by decision b for project B. Similarly, when project B succeeds, its realized
return is given by h(b) + q(a).9 If a project fails, its return is zero.
The choice of human capital is each agent’s inalienable decision. How-
ever, the decision right for each project can be allocated. A party is said
to have the authority over project A (B, resp.) when the party has the
right to choose a (b, resp.) and to implement the project if it is successful.
Note that our definition of authority goes beyond the usual definition as,
for example, in Grossman-Hart-Moore.10 The usual definition involves only
the right to make a decision whereas, in our model, authority combines the
right to make a decision and the right to implement it. We believe that
separating decision making and implementation processes describes more
9Externalities are thus two-sided and symmetric. Symmetry is not essential for our
main results but simplifies notation and analysis. In Section 5.2, we discuss the case of
one-sided externality.
10In the Grossman-Hart-Moore setting, only the investment in human capital is made at
the ex ante stage while renegotiation over the surplus proceeds before the decision is made.
This gives bargaining power to the party who is initially allocated ownership even though
ownership entails only the right to make a decision. It is a matter of interpretation but
we are inclined to favor our interpretation as the one that describes better the processes
of project choice and implementation within an organization. In Section 5.5, we discuss
how our results change when we adopt the time-line as in Grossman-Hart-Moore.
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accurately how business organizations operate in reality.11 The party that
makes a decision learns valuable knowledge about the project during the
decision-making process, which is indispensable in the subsequent imple-
mentation of the project. Then it is clear why it is reasonable to assign the
right to make a decision and the right to implement a project to the same
party. The knowledge about and the right to implement a project is the
source of bargaining power for the party with authority. This is described
in more detail below. We follow the incomplete contracting literature and
assume that none of the variables (a, b) and (eA, eB) are contractible. The
initial contract thus specifies the allocation of authorities only. The timing
of the game is as follows:
1. Date 0 (Organization Choice): An organizational structure is chosen
by determining the allocation of authorities. We focus on the optimal
structure that maximizes the total payoff for the organization as a
whole.12
2. Date 1 (Decisions and Human Capital Investment): All parties simul-
taneously choose a, b, eA and eB. The parties with relevant authorities
make decisions over the projects, and each agent chooses the level of
human capital in addition to the decision over the project, should he
be allocated the authority. The realized values of a, b, eA and eB are
observed by all parties at the end of date 1.
3. Date 2 (Bargaining and Implementation): The relevant parties bar-
gain over the return from each successful project. We assume that
the bargaining takes place bilaterally and leads to a symmetric Nash
bargaining outcome. For each project, there are at most two rele-
vant parties: the party with authority and the party with necessary
human capital.13 We further assume that the bargaining proceeds se-
quentially: a negotiation over the return from project A occurs first
and, given this bargaining outcome, a negotiation over the return from
project B takes place.14
11See, for example, Khalil et al. (2006).
12For example, if all the parties have unlimited wealth, then the organization that
maximizes the total payoff is optimal due to the Coase theorem. Alternatively one can
imagine the design problem faced by outside stakeholders, say, shareholders.
13If one party has the authority as well as necessary human capital, then that party has
the full claim over the return.
14As an example, consider hierarchical delegation where agent A is at the middle tier
of the hierarchy. Then, the manager (who has the authority over project A) first bargains
with agent A (who has necessary human capital for project A) over the return from project
A. Next, agent A (who has the authority over project B) bargains over the return from
project B with agent B (who has necessary human capital for project B). The parties
with authorities implement successful projects and the return is realized.
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We offer some elaboration on the above time-line. First, for each pair
bargaining over the return from the project, the bargaining power is derived
from the authority and/or necessary human capital. The party with au-
thority may refuse to implement a successful project while the party with
necessary human capital may threaten to withdraw his human capital. Thus
the authority and human capital are both indispensable in realizing the re-
turn from the successful project.15 Second, we assume that decisions (a, b)
and the levels of human capital (eA, eB) are simultaneously determined at
date 1. This is equivalent to assuming that the agents invest in (eA, eB) be-
fore decisions (a, b) are made, but (eA, eB) remain private information when
the decisions are made. In this scenario, there is no room for renegotiation of
the initial allocation of authorities. However, if the levels of human capital
are chosen and observed before the decisions are made, then a mutually ben-
eficial renegotiation of allocating authorities may occur in the interim stage,
given the levels of human capital. Section 5.5 discusses this case. Third, we
adopt the specific bargaining protocol whereby bargaining over the return
from each project takes place bilaterally and sequentially, and each bilateral
bargaining leads to a symmetric Nash bargaining outcome. This is for the
sake of clarity in our analysis. In Section 5.3, we show that our results do
not change if we use the Shapley value to calculate the bargaining payoff for
each party.
In what follows, we will adopt the shorthand notation: hs ≡ h(S),
hc ≡ h(C), qs ≡ q(S) and qc ≡ q(C). Also let ∆h ≡ hs−hc and ∆q ≡ qc−qs.
We maintain the following assumption throughout the paper.
Assumption 1. (i) hs > hc ≥ 0, (ii) ∆q > ∆h, and (iii) qs ≥ 0.
Assumption 1 says that the selfish decision maximizes the return from
each project (Assumption 1(i)) but the cooperative decision maximizes the
overall return from the two projects, provided the two agents choose the
same level of human capital (Assumption 1(ii)). To see this, note that the
ex ante total surplus is given by P (eA)[h(a) + q(b)] + P (eB)[h(b) + q(a)] −
c(eA) − c(eB). Then Assumption 1(ii) implies that, given eA = eB, the
decision that maximizes the above surplus is a = b = C. It is easy to see
that a = b = C along with eA = eB = e∗ ≡ φ(hc + qc) constitute the
first-best outcome where φ denotes the inverse function of c′/P ′.
Since there are three parties and two decisions, there are nine possible
15Of course, the party with authority will always implement the project as long as
his/her bargaining payoff is nonnegative. Similarly, the party with necessary human cap-
ital will refrain from withdrawing his human capital as long as his bargaining payoff is
nonnegative. One might ask whether the authority to implement the project can be trans-
ferred to another party at date 2. We assume this is not possible since the party with
authority learns the details about the project through his/her decision making, which
cannot be transferred to another party.
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organizational structures depending on the allocation of initial authorities.
This is shown in Table 1 where the column corresponding to each party
lists various cases in which the party has the authority over relevant deci-
sion(s). In centralization, the manager has the authority over both projects.
In partial decentralization, the manager has the authority over project n
(n = A,B) while agent k (k 6= n) has the authority over project k. Intu-
itively such partial decentralization is unable to achieve coordination while
depriving motivation from agent n. In Section 3.2, we show that partial de-
centralization is indeed dominated by decentralization, which is defined next.
In decentralization, each agent is delegated the authority over one project.
Two cases arise. First, agent n is allocated the authority over project n
(n = A,B). Second, agent n is allocated the authority over project k where
n 6= k (n, k = A,B), which we call cross-authority decentralization. In
Section 3.2, we show that cross-authority decentralization turns out to be
equivalent to centralization.
In hierarchical delegation, the authority over one project, say project A,
is allocated to the manager, while the authority over the other project, i.e.,
project B, is allocated to agent A. In this case, a three-tier hierarchy is char-
acterized by successive allocation of authorities where agent A plays the role
as a ‘middleman’ while agent B is at the bottom tier of the hierarchy. The
three-tier hierarchy can be best understood as a chain of command where
the party at the lower tier should ‘report’ to the immediate superior. For
example, consider hierarchical delegation where agent A is the middleman.
Then agent B needs to report to agent A, who makes a decision that governs
agent B’s task. Agent A in turn needs to report to the manager, who makes
a decision that governs agent A’s task. Finally, in concentrated delegation,
one agent is given authority over both projects. Clearly this should be su-
perior to hierarchical delegation because the coordination benefits can be
secured without loss in the incentives to invest in human capital; in both
types of delegation, the agent without authority suffers from the same lack
of incentives to invest in human capital. This is shown in Section 5.4.
— Table 1 goes about here. —
In our basic model, we assume that each agent has limited expertise,
implying that each agent can deal with at most one project. Thus we do
not consider the case of concentrated delegation except in Section 5.4. The
limited expertise is partly due to the time constraint each agent faces in
learning various aspects about a project in order to make a decision. More-
over, agents need to commit sufficient resources to investment in human
capital. Indeed, limited expertise is one of the reasons why decision-making
is delegated in a hierarchical fashion despite possible coordination problems.
The manager, on the other hand, can make decisions for both projects since
she may have some prior knowledge about the projects from past manage-
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ment experience, nor does she need to make investment in project-specific
human capital. That the manager does not have limited expertise is a nec-
essary condition for centralization to be feasible in the first place.
Assumption 2. Each agent can deal with the decision for at most one
project.
Assumption 2, along with afore-mentioned discussions, allows us to fo-
cus our analyses on three types of organizational structures: centralization,
decentralization, and hierarchical delegation.
3 Organizational Structures and Equilibria
3.1 Centralization
In centralization, the manager has the authority over both projects. Due
to our assumption on the bargaining protocol, the manager first bargains
with agent A over the return from project A. Then the bargaining over the
return from project B proceeds between the manager and agent B.
Suppose that project A succeeds. Then, given the realization of the
return h(a) + q(b), the bargaining between the manager and agent A leads
to the following payoff for the manager:
1
2
{h(a) + q(b)}. (2)
Similarly, when project B succeeds, the manager obtains the following payoff
from the negotiation with agent B over the return from project B:
1
2
{h(b) + q(a)}. (3)
Thus the manager’s total expected payoff is given by
P (eA)
1
2
{h(a) + q(b)}+ P (eB)12{h(b) + q(a)}. (4)
Agent A’s expected payoff is
1
2
P (eA){h(a) + q(b)} − c(eA), (5)
while agent B’s expected payoff is
1
2
P (eB){h(b) + q(a)} − c(eB). (6)
At date 1, the manager chooses a and b while the agents choose eA and
eB to maximize respective expected payoff. Let us denote
11
e ≡ φ
(
1
2
(hs + qc)
)
, e ≡ φ
(
1
2
(hc + qs)
)
(7)
where φ was defined as φ ≡ (c′/P ′)−1.
In the above, e (e, resp.) is the level of human capital that agent n
(n = A,B) will choose if he bargains over the return from project n with
one other party, and if the decision for project n is a selfish (cooperative,
resp.) one while the decision for project k (k 6= n) is a cooperative (selfish,
resp.) one. Since φ is monotone increasing, we must have e > e. Then we
obtain the following.
Proposition 1. Suppose the following condition holds:
P (e)∆h < P (e)∆q. (*)
Then, in centralization, there exists a unique equilibrium in which the man-
ager chooses a = b = C and both agents choose the same level of human
capital given by
ec ≡ φ
(
1
2
(hc + qc)
)
. (8)
Proof. See Appendix.
Condition (*) states that the external benefit from cooperative decision
(∆q) is large enough relative to the importance of human capital. Since the
manager has the authority over both projects, she would fully internalize
the externality in this case. On the other hand, each agent’s incentive to
invest in human capital is distorted downward as he obtains only a half of
the return, i.e., (1/2)(hc + qc), by bargaining with the manager. Note that
ec < e∗ ≡ φ(hc+ qc), the level of investment in the first-best outcome. Note
also that, given a = b = C, the agents choose the same level of human
capital.
If condition (*) is violated, then it can be shown that an asymmetric
equilibrium exists in which the manager chooses a = S and b = C, agent
A chooses eA = e, and agent B chooses eB = e. In Section 3.3, we show
that this asymmetric equilibrium is equivalent to the one under hierarchi-
cal delegation. To make the welfare comparison of different organizational
structures nontrivial, we maintain condition (*) throughout the paper. Then
the total equilibrium expected payoffs under centralization are
VC ≡ 2{P (ec)(hc + qc)− c(ec).} (9)
3.2 Decentralization
There are two possible cases of decentralization. Consider first the case of
cross-authority decentralization in which agent A (B, resp.) is allocated the
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authority over project B (A, resp.). In this case, agent n (n = A,B) obtains
the following expected payoff
(1/2)P (eA)(h(a) + q(b)) + (1/2)P (eB)(h(b) + q(a))− c(en). (10)
The following lemma shows that, under condition (*), cross-authority
decentralization leads to the same equilibrium outcome as in centralization.
Lemma. Suppose that agent n is assigned the authority over project k
(n, k = A,B, n 6= k). Then, if condition (*) is satisfied, there exists a
unique equilibrium in which both agents choose the same level of human
capital ec and a = b = C.
Proof. See Appendix.
The above lemma shows that decentralization leads to an outcome dif-
ferent from centralization only when agent n is allocated the authority over
project n, n = A,B. In what follows, we will refer to this as decentraliza-
tion: each agent is allocated the authority over the project for which his
human capital is indispensable. This implies that each agent enjoys the full
return from the relevant project.
Then agent A chooses a and eA to maximize the expected payoff:
P (eA){h(a) + q(b)} − c(eA), (11)
given agent B choosing b and eB. By Assumption 1 (i), agent A then chooses
a = S irrespective of eA. Similarly, agent B chooses b and eB to maximize
P (eB){h(b) + q(a)} − c(eB), (12)
given a and eA. Thus agent B chooses b = S.
Given a = b = S, agent n’s expected payoff is
P (en)(hs + qs)− c(en). (13)
Maximizing this with respect to en leads to
en = ed ≡ φ(hs + qs). (14)
Then the total equilibrium expected payoffs under decentralization are
VD ≡ 2{P (ed)(hs + qs)− c(ed)}. (15)
Before turning to hierarchical delegation, we need to comment on par-
tial decentralization: the manager has the authority over one project, say
project A, and delegates the authority over project B to agent B. It is easy
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to see that such an organizational structure is dominated by decentraliza-
tion. Observe first that neither the manager nor agent B cares about the
externality. The manager’s payoff depends only on the return from project
A, hence she will choose a = S to maximize her expected payoff. Agent
B will also choose b = S since his payoff depends only on the return from
project B. Then agent B’s expected payoff is P (eB)(hs + qs) − c(eB), the
same as that in decentralization. Thus agent B chooses the same level of
human capital, ed, as in decentralization. However, agent A’s expected pay-
off is (1/2)P (eA)(hs + qs) − c(eA), hence his equilibrium level of human
capital, denoted by eˆ, is strictly less than that in decentralization. Since
ed maximizes P (e)(hs + qs) − c(e) over e ∈ [0, E] and ed 6= eˆ, we must
have VD > P (eˆ)(hs + qs)− c(eˆ) + P (ed)(hs + qs)− c(ed). Therefore partial
decentralization is dominated by decentralization.
3.3 Hierarchical delegation
We now study hierarchical delegation where the manager has the authority
over one project, say project A, and delegates to agent A the authority over
project B. In this case, agent A plays the role of a “middle agent”, who
bargains with the manager over the return from project A since his human
capital is needed to complete project A, and with agent B over the return
from project B since he makes the decision for project B.
Then the manager’s expected payoff from bargaining with agent A is
1
2
P (eA){h(a) + q(b)}, (16)
and agent B’s expected payoff from bargaining with agent A is
1
2
P (eB){h(b) + q(a)} − c(eB). (17)
On the other hand, agent A obtains a half of the return from each successful
project. Thus his expected payoff is
1
2
P (eA){h(a) + q(b)}+ 12P (eB){h(b) + q(a)} − c(eA). (18)
At date 1, the manager chooses a to maximize her expected payoff in
(16), agent B chooses eB to maximize his expected payoff in (17), and agent
A chooses b and eA to maximize his expected payoff in (18). Since the
manager does not care about the return from project B, it is clear that she
will make a selfish decision a = S by Assumption 1 (i), irrespective of b,
eA and eB. Agent A, however, cares about the return from both projects,
implying that he will internalize the externality to some extent by making
a cooperative decision b = C. Moreover his incentive to invest in human
capital is also higher compared to centralization. Insofar as the externality
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is not fully internalized, agent B’s incentive to invest in human capital is
lower than in centralization. More formally, we can establish the following
result.
Proposition 2. In hierarchical delegation, there exists a unique equilib-
rium in which the manager chooses a = S, the agent at the middle tier of
the hierarchy chooses b = C and e ≡ φ((1/2)(hs+ qc)), and the agent at the
bottom tier chooses e ≡ φ((1/2)(hc + qs)).
Proof. See Appendix.
It is easy to check e < ec < e. That is, in hierarchical delegation, the
middle agent chooses a higher level of human capital than in centralization
although the bottom agent chooses a lower level of human capital. Two
effects arise under hierarchal delegation. First, since the manager has the
authority over project A only, she will choose the selfish strategy a = S to
maximize only the return from project A. This can raise agent A’s bargain-
ing payoff from project A because his human capital is necessary in imple-
menting project A. Second, since agent A has the authority over project
B, he has, due to Assumption 1, the incentive to internalize the externality
by choosing the cooperative strategy b = C for project B, although it will
reduce agent B’s incentive to invest in human capital.
Let VH denote the total expected payoffs under hierarchal delegation:
VH ≡ P (e)(hs + qc)− c(e) + P (e)(hc + qs)− c(e). (19)
In Table 2, we summarize the results we obtained so far.
— Table 2 goes about here. —
4 Comparison of Organizational Structures
The analyses of the previous section highlight the costs and benefits of differ-
ent organizational structures. Centralization can coordinate decisions for the
projects, thereby internalizing the externalities. But the agents’ incentives
to invest in human capital are weaker than in decentralization. The cost of
decentralization is the lack of coordination and the accompanied loss of ex-
ternal benefits. In hierarchical delegation, the ‘empowered’ middle agent has
the strongest incentive to invest in human capital, at the same time internal-
izing the externalities to some extent through his decision-making authority
over one project. The downside is that the ‘disempowered’ bottom agent
has the weakest incentive to invest in human capital. This section offers
a more detailed welfare comparison of the three organizational structures.
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The comparison of centralization and decentralization is rather straightfor-
ward. For this, let us call ∆q the coordination benefit, which is the increase
in the return from one project regardless of its decision when the decision
for the other project changes from S to C. Similarly, let us call ∆h the
deviation benefit, which is the increase in the return from one project when
its own decision changes from C to S regardless of the decision for the other
project. We may then call ∆q−∆h the relative coordination benefit. Then
we can show the following.
Proposition 3. (i) If ∆q is sufficiently large, then centralization domi-
nates decentralization. (ii) If ∆q − ∆h converges to zero, then decentral-
ization dominates centralization. (iii) If both ∆q and ∆h converge to zero,
then decentralization becomes optimal, i.e., it dominates both centralization
and hierarchical delegation.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 can be offered as follows. If the coor-
dination benefit is large, then the two decisions should be made by a single
party, i.e., the manager. Thus centralization becomes optimal. On the other
hand, if the relative coordination benefit is small, the main issue is how to
motivate the agents to invest in their human capital. Since such incentives
are stronger in decentralization than in centralization, the former dominates
the latter when ∆q−∆h becomes small. However, this does not necessarily
mean that decentralization also dominates hierarchical delegation. It is be-
cause, in hierarchical delegation, the middle agent still has the strongest in-
centive even in the limiting case where ∆q−∆h converges to zero: his choice
of human capital is given by φ((1/2)(hs+qc)) = φ((1/2)(hc+qs+∆h+∆q)),
which converges to φ((1/2)(hc+qs+2∆h)) when ∆q → ∆h. Thus the middle
agent is motivated to invest in human capital not only through the coor-
dination benefit but also through the deviation benefit. Insofar as these
benefits are significant, hierarchical delegation provides strong incentives to
the middle agent. Therefore, it is not clear whether decentralization becomes
optimal even in the limiting case of ∆q → ∆h. However, if both ∆q and
∆h become sufficiently small, the level of human capital chosen by the mid-
dle agent in hierarchical delegation converges to that chosen by the bottom
agent. In this case, not only does the coordination benefit of hierarchical
delegation disappear, but also ‘empowerment’ fails to provide strong incen-
tives to invest in human capital. In such a limiting case, decentralization
becomes optimal.
Then when does hierarchical delegation emerge as an optimal organiza-
tional structure? Our discussions so far suggest it would be the case in the in-
termediate range of the coordination benefit. To show this as clearly as pos-
sible, we will simplify the basic model and notation as follows: h ≡ hs > 0,
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hc = 0, q ≡ qc > 0 and qs > 0 where q ≥ qs + h.
Then condition (*) can be written as
P (φ((1/2)(h+ q)))h < P (φ((1/2)qs)(q − qs). (*)
Since P (·) < 1, one sufficient condition for condition (*) to hold is
h/P (φ((1/2)qs) + qs ≤ q.
Given the above simplification and condition (*), our results so far can be
summarized again. In centralization, both agents choose the same level of
human capital ec ≡ φ((1/2)q) and the total expected payoffs are given by
VC ≡ 2{P (ec)q − c(ec)}. (20)
In decentralization, both agents choose the same level of human capital
ed ≡ φ(h+ qs) and the total expected payoffs are given by
VD ≡ 2{P (ed)(h+ qs)− c(ed)}. (21)
In hierarchical delegation, the middle agent chooses the level of human cap-
ital e ≡ φ((1/2)(h + q)) and the bottom agent chooses e ≡ φ((1/2)qs), and
the total expected payoffs are given by
VH ≡ P (e)(h+ q)− c(e) + P (e)qs − c(e). (22)
The following proposition shows that hierarchical delegation is indeed
an optimal organizational structure in the intermediate range of the coordi-
nation benefit.
Proposition 4. If h > 0, qs > 0 are small and hc = 0, then there ex-
ists an interval (q, q) such that, for all q ∈ (q, q), hierarchical delegation is
an optimal organizational structure.
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 1 shows the total expected payoffs in different organizational
structures as the functions of q ≡ qc where h ≡ hs > 0 and qs are suffi-
ciently small and hc = 0. Given the simplification of parameter values, q
approximates the coordination benefit and h represents the deviation bene-
fit. As shown in the figure, when the deviation benefit is sufficiently small,
decentralization is never optimal for any value of q. On the other hand, cen-
tralization becomes optimal when q becomes large. Hierarchical delegation
dominates the other two in the intermediate range of q such that condition
(*) is not violated.
— Figure 1 goes about here. —
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5 Extensions of the Basic Model
This section discusses several extensions of our basic model. First, we in-
troduce some asymmetries: the agents may differ either in how their human
capital contributes to the success of projects, or in their cost of investment
in human capital. Given the asymmetries, we study the optimal pattern of
hierarchical delegation. That is, who should be at the middle tier of the
hierarchy? Second and related to the first extension, we consider the case
of one-sided externality: the external benefit flows from one project to the
other, but not the other way around. We again study the optimal pattern
of hierarchical delegation. Third, our results so far have been derived using
the symmetric Nash bargaining solution to determine the outcome from each
bilateral bargaining. We show that they are robust to alternative bargaining
solutions such as the Shapley value. Fourth, we allow the agents to have
sufficient expertise so that both decisions can be made by a single agent, if
necessary. We show in this case that hierarchical delegation is never opti-
mal, which confirms the folklore that limited expertise is one of the reasons
for hierarchical organizations. Finally, we look at alternative timing of the
game in which the project-specific decisions are made after the agents choose
to invest in their human capital and observe each other’s choice. This opens
up the possibility of renegotiation over the allocation of decision authority.
Hierarchical delegation is again shown to be suboptimal in this case.
5.1 The case of asymmetric agents
The agents were assumed symmetric in our basic model. Therefore either
of the two agents can be at the middle tier of a hierarchy. We now relax
the symmetry assumption to discuss the optimal pattern of hierarchical
delegation. That is, we ask who should be the middle agent in optimal
hierarchical delegation when the agents are asymmetric. Asymmetry can be
introduced either through the success probability of each project or through
the agents’ cost of investment in human capital. Since the main benefit of
hierarchical delegation stems from stronger incentives provided to the middle
agent, one could conjecture that the agent who can be better motivated
through empowerment should be at the middle tier of the hierarchy. In
what follows, we confirm this conjecture.
Let us denote by Pn(e) ∈ (0, 1) and cn(e) the success probability of
project n and agent n’s cost of investing in human capital, respectively. De-
note the inverse function of c′n/P ′n by φn ≡ (c′n/P ′n)−1. Assume, as before,
that φn is increasing. Recall that φ′n measures agent n’s marginal incentive
to invest in human capital. Then we can show the following.
Proposition 5. If 2Pn(φn(x)) + c′n(φn(x))φ′n(x) > 2Pj(φj(x)) +
c′j(φj(x))φ′j(x) for all x ∈ [(1/2)(hc + qs), (1/2)(hs + qc)] for n 6= j, then
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hierarchical delegation with agent n at the middle tier dominates hierarchical
delegation with agent j 6= n at the middle tier.
Proof. See Appendix.
Although the condition in Proposition 5 may seem rather complicated,
we can verify that it is satisfied in the following case: c(e) ≡ cA(e) = cB(e)
but Pn(e) > Pj(e), P ′n(e) > P ′j(e) for all e ∈ [0, E], and φ′n(x) > φ′j(x) for all
x ∈ [(1/2)(hc+qs), (1/2)(hs+qc)]. In other words, the agents have the same
cost function but their success probabilities and marginal incentives defined
by φ′n are different. In this case, since φn(x) > φj(x) holds, one can verify
the condition in Proposition 5 using c′′ > 0 and P ′i > 0. It seems reasonable
to interpret the condition to imply that agent n is more efficient than agent
j in terms of success probabilities - both total and marginal - and better
motivated in terms of marginal incentives. Then the above proposition says
that the more efficient agent who can be better motivated should be assigned
to the middle tier of a hierarchy. This intuition continues to hold when
the agents differ in their costs of investment in human capital. Consider a
quadratic example: cn(e) = (γn/2)e2 and Pn(e) = ηne where γn > 0 and
ηn > 0. Then φn(x) = (ηn/γn)x, hence 2Pn(φn(x)) + c′n(φn(x))φ′n(x) =
3(η2n/γn)x. Thus, if agent n is more efficient than agent j in the sense that
γn < γj and ηn > ηj , then agent n should be assigned to the middle tier of
a hierarchy. It is straightforward to check φ′n > φ′j in this case, hence agent
n also has a higher marginal incentive.
However, it is not necessarily the case that the more efficient agent, e.g.,
whose cost is lower than the other, should always be at the middle tier of
a hierarchy. An additional condition is that the middle agent should also
have a higher marginal incentive than the other. To illustrate this, we take
an extreme example: cA(e) ≡ 0 for all e ∈ [0, E] but cB(e) has the same
property as in the previous example. We also assume that PA(e) > PB(e)
for all e ∈ [0, E]. Thus agent A is more efficient than agent B in the sense
that his cost is lower and his success probability is higher. However, agent A
will always choose the highest level of human capital E in any organizational
structures since cA(e) ≡ 0. Thus his marginal incentive is zero. On the other
hand, agent B will choose eB ≡ φB((1/2)(hc + qs)) if he is at the bottom
tier, and eB ≡ φB((1/2)(hs + qc)) if he is at the middle tier.16
The total expected payoffs under hierarchical delegation are then
V AH ≡ PA(E)(hs + qc) + PB(eB)(hc + qs)− cB(eB), (23)
16Here we are assuming that the middle agent makes the cooperative decision C re-
gardless of who is at the middle tier of the hierarchy. This is true when agent A is at
the middle tier because PA(E)∆q > PB(eB)∆h always holds for all eB ∈ [0, E]. When
agent B is at the middle tier, he would choose b = C if PB(eˆB)∆q ≥ PA(E)∆h where
eˆB ≡ φB((1/2)(hs + qs)). We assume this condition is satisfied.
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when agent A is at the middle tier of a hierarchy, and
V BH ≡ PB(eB)(hs + qc) + PA(E)(hc + qs)− cB(eB). (24)
when agent B is at the middle tier of a hierarchy.
Taking the difference between the two expected payoffs and using φ ≡
(c′/P ′)−1, we have
V AH − V BH =
∫ (1/2)(hs+qc)
(1/2)(hc+qs)
{2PA(E)− [2PB(φB(x)) + c′B(φB(x))φ′B(x)]}dx
(25)
which is negative if
2PA(E) < 2PB(φB(x)) + c′B(φB(x))φ
′
B(x) (26)
for all x ∈ [(1/2)(hc+ qs), (1/2)(hs+ qc)]. To see when condition (26) holds,
consider the quadratic example again: PB(e) = ηBe, PA(e) = ηAe, where
ηA > ηB, and cB(e) = (γB/2)e2 where γB > 0. We also have cA(e) ≡ 0.
Since 2PB(φB(x)) + c′B(φB(x))φ
′
B(x) = 3(η
2
B/γB)x, the above inequality
will hold if 2PA(E) < 3(η2B/γB)[(1/2)(hc + qs)]. In this case, hierarchical
delegation with agent A in the middle performs worse than that with agent
B in the middle, even if agent A is more efficient than agent B.
We summarize the discussion in this subsection. When the agents are
asymmetric, the optimal pattern of hierarchical delegation depends not only
on the relative efficiency in terms of success probabilities and costs, but also
on the marginal incentive that empowerment provides to each agent. If one
agent is more efficient as well as better motivated, then he should be at
the middle tier of a hierarchy. However, the more efficient agent should not
necessarily be at the middle tier of a hierarchy if his marginal incentive is
lower than the other.
5.2 One-sided externality
In many organizations, externalities may run only in one direction. For
example, the production division can choose to produce a single standard
product at lower costs, or several differentiated, more marketable products
at higher costs. The latter choice will make it easier for the sales division
to market the products: given the same level of human capital invested in
the sales division, its performance will be better when products are more
marketable. The relevant question is then which division should be at the
middle tier of a hierarchical organization. Intuitively, the beneficiary of the
externality should make the decision for the benefactor division. The main
reason is that, given the decision authority over the benefactor division,
the beneficiary will make a decision that internalizes the externality. This
further strengthens the beneficiary’s incentive to invest in human capital.
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To formalize this, suppose the externality runs from project B to project
A only. The return from project B is now given by h(b) while the return
from project A is the same as before, h(a) + q(b). The rest of the model
remains the same as our basic model.
Suppose first that agent B is at the middle tier of the hierarchy. Then
the manager makes the decision for project B while agent B makes the
decision for project A. Clearly, the manager’s optimal decision is b = S.
Let us denote the equilibrium levels of human capital by e˜A and e˜B. It is
easy to see that agent B also chooses a = S and, given e˜A, he chooses eB to
maximize the following expected payoff:
1
2
P (eB)hs +
1
2
P (e˜A)(hs + qs)− c(eB). (27)
This leads to
e˜B = φ((1/2)hs). (28)
Given a = b = S and e˜B, agent A chooses eA to maximize his expected
payoff,
1
2
P (eA)(hs + qs)− c(eA) (29)
leading to
e˜A = φ((1/2)(hs + qs)). (30)
Then the total expected payoffs are
V BH ≡ P (e˜A)(hs + qs) + P (e˜B)hs − c(e˜A)− c(e˜B). (31)
Suppose now that agent A is at the middle tier of the hierarchy. The
manager’s optimal choice is again a = S. Let us denote the equilibrium
levels of human capital by e′A and e
′
B. Given a = S and e
′
B, agent A chooses
b and eA to maximize his expected payoff,
1
2
P (eA)(hs + q(b)) +
1
2
P (e′B)h(b)− c(eA). (32)
Agent A chooses b = C if and only if P (e′A)∆q ≥ P (e′B)∆h. It is easy to see
that, for any b ∈ {S,C}, we have e′A > e′B. Thus agent A’s optimal decision
is b = C and his equilibrium level of human capital is given by
e′A = φ((1/2)(hs + qc)). (33)
Given a = S, b = C and e′A, agent B’s equilibrium level of human capital is
given by
e′B = φ((1/2)hc). (34)
The total expected payoffs are then
V AH ≡ P (e′A)(hs + qc) + P (e′B)hc − c(e′A)− c(e′B). (35)
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Summarizing the above discussions, hierarchical delegation with agent
B – the benefactor of the externality – at the middle tier leads to a =
b = S, eA = e˜A, eB = e˜B, while hierarchical delegation with agent A –
the beneficiary of the externality – at the middle tier leads to a = S, b =
C, eA = e′A, eB = e
′
B. Comparing these equilibria, the benefits of putting
the beneficiary at the middle tier of the hierarchy become clear. First, the
beneficiary makes a decision that internalizes the externality. Second, this
further strengthens the beneficiary’s own incentives to invest in human capi-
tal. As can be seen from (30) and (33), agent A’s equilibrium level of human
capital is higher when he is at the middle tier of the hierarchy: e′A > e˜A.
We are now ready to establish the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Suppose the externality runs from project B to project
A only. Then hierarchical delegation where agent A is at the middle tier
dominates hierarchical delegation where agent B is at the middle tier.
Proof. See Appendix.
5.3 Alternative bargaining solution: Shapley value
We have so far assumed a simple bargaining structure whereby bargaining
over the return from each project takes place bilaterally and sequentially,
and each bilateral bargaining leads to a symmetric Nash bargaining outcome.
In this subsection we show that our results remain robust if we use the
Shapley value instead to determine the ex post bargaining payoff for all three
parties.17 Let us denote the return from project A by f(a, b) ≡ h(a) + q(b).
Then the return from project B is f(b, a).
Consider first centralization. Suppose project A succeeds. Since the
manager has the decision authority over project A, agent A has the necessary
human capital, and agent B plays no role in project A, f(a, b) is shared
equally between the manager and agent A. Similarly, if project B succeeds,
its return f(b, a) is split equally between the manager and agent B. Thus
the manager’s expected payoff determined by the Shapley value is given by
P (eA)P (eB){(1/2)f(a, b) + (1/2)f(b, a)}+ P (eA)(1− P (eB))(1/2)f(a, b)
+ (1− P (eA))P (eB)(1/2)f(b, a)
= P (eA)(1/2)f(a, b) + P (eB)(1/2)f(b, a) (36)
which is the same as the manager’s expected payoff in our basic model. It is
easy to check that each agent’s expected payoff determined by the Shapley
value is also the same as the one in our basic model. Consequently, replacing
17See, for example, Gul (1989) for a non-cooperative game theoretic foundation of the
Shapley value.
22
the bargaining outcomes by those based on the Shapley value does not alter
any of the results.
Consider next hierarchical delegation where agent A is at the middle
tier. If project A succeeds, then the manager and agent A equally split the
return f(a, b). If both projects succeed, then agent A obtains his Shapley
value payoff (1/2)f(a, b) + (1/2)f(b, a) since he has the necessary human
capital for project A and the decision authority over project B. Finally, if
only project B succeeds, then agent A will obtain (1/2)f(b, a). Thus, agent
A’s expected payoff determined by the Shapley value can be written as
P (eA)(1− P (eB))(1/2)f(a, b) + P (eA)P (eB){(1/2)f(a, b) + (1/2)f(b, a)}
+ (1− P (eA))P (eB)(1/2)f(b, a)− c(eA)
= (1/2)P (eA)f(a, b) + (1/2)P (eB)f(b, a)− c(eA) (37)
which is again the same as the one in our basic model. It is also straight-
forward to check that the expected payoffs of the manager and agent B do
not change either.
Finally, in decentralization, each agent obtains the full return from his
project, implying that their expected payoffs remain the same even if we
replace the bargaining outcomes in our basic model by those based on the
Shapley value.
5.4 The case of unlimited expertise
One of the reasons for hierarchical delegation is the agents’ limited exper-
tise. Expertise in our model is identified with the capability of exercising
the authority over a given project. With limited expertise, feasible organi-
zational structures are limited to decentralization or hierarchical delegation.
Suppose now one of the agents has unlimited expertise, capable of exercising
the authority over both projects. Intuitively, then, allocating the authority
over both projects to that agent should dominate hierarchical delegation.
There are two primary benefits. First, the agent with authority will inter-
nalize externalities. Second, this will motivate the agent without authority
to invest in his human capital beyond the level chosen in hierarchical del-
egation. Indeed the second benefit is realized regardless of the decisions
made since, in hierarchical delegation, the “disempowered” bottom agent’s
incentive to invest in human capital is the lowest among all organizational
structures.
To formalize this, suppose that agent A is allocated the authority over
both projects. We will call this organizational structure concentrated delega-
tion. In this case, agent A obtains the full return from project A and a half
of the return from project B. Thus agent A chooses a ∈ {S,C}, b ∈ {S,C}
and eA ∈ [0, E], given agent B’s level of human capital eB, to maximize his
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expected payoff:
P (eA)(h(a) + q(b)) +
1
2
P (eB)(h(b) + q(a))− c(eA). (38)
Agent B chooses eB to maximize his expected payoff:
1
2
P (eB)(h(b) + q(a))− c(eB). (39)
Let (a˜, b˜, e˜A, e˜B) be the equilibrium outcome in concentrated delegation.
Note that agent B’s equilibrium level of human capital (e˜B) is higher than
that (e) in hierarchical delegation with agent B at the bottom tier. This is
because e = φ((1/2)(hc + qs)) ≤ e˜B = φ((1/2)(h(b˜) + q(a˜))) since h(b) ≥ hc
and q(a) ≥ qs for any a and b. Then the total expected payoffs under
concentrated delegation are
VCD ≡ P (e˜A)(h(a˜) + q(b˜))− c(e˜A) + P (e˜B)(h(b˜) + q(a˜))− c(e˜B). (40)
The following proposition shows that concentrated delegation dominates
hierarchical delegation.
Proposition 7. Suppose that one agent has sufficient expertise to exercise
the authority over both projects. Then hierarchical delegation is dominated
by concentrated delegation where the authority over both projects is delegated
to the agent with sufficient expertise.
Proof. See Appendix.
5.5 Alternative timing and the possibility of renegotiation
In our basic model, the investment in human capital and the project-specific
decisions are made simultaneously. A rationale for this modeling assumption
was that the investment in human capital may not be observed even if
the project-specific decisions are made after the investment. In this case,
there is no room for renegotiating the initial allocation of authorities before
the decisions are made. However, renegotiation becomes an issue if the
investment in human capital is observed, albeit not verifiable, before the
project-specific decisions are made.
This subsection considers alternative timing and discusses how the pos-
sibility of renegotiation changes the comparison of different organizational
structures. Specifically we consider the following scenario. At date 0, an
organizational structure is chosen by determining the allocation of decision
authorities.18 At date 1, the agents choose simultaneously the levels of hu-
man capital, which are then observed by all parties. Between date 1 and date
18Assumption 2 is retained here. That is, both agents have limited expertise.
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2, called the interim stage, the parties renegotiate over the re-allocation of
authorities. At date 2, the parties with authorities after renegotiation make
the project-specific decisions.
To simply the argument, we will assume that h ≡ hs > hc = 0 and
q ≡ qc > qs = 0. We further make the following assumption:
P (E)h ≤ P (0)q, (**)
which implies P (ei)h ≤ P (ej)q for all ei ∈ [0, E] and ej ∈ [0, E], i 6= j. In
this case, the benefit from cooperative decision is large enough so that it
becomes optimal to re-allocate the decision authorities at the interim stage,
should that induce the cooperative decisions for both projects whatever lev-
els of human capital were chosen at date 1. From our previous analysis,
we know that the cooperative decisions for both projects are supported in
equilibrium if and only if centralization was chosen at date 0. Therefore
renegotiation at the interim stage has potential benefits if either decentral-
ization or hierarchical delegation was chosen at date 0.
We assume the following renegotiation process. At the interim stage,
the manager (agent n, resp.) can make a take-it-or-leave-it renegotiation
offer to the other players with probability αP ∈ (0, 1) (αn ∈ (0, 1), resp.),
where αP + αA + αB = 1. We further impose the symmetry condition:
α ≡ αA = αB where α ∈ (0, 1/2). If the renegotiation offer is rejected
by any player, then the subsequent game is played according to the initial
allocation of authorities.
First, suppose decentralization was chosen at date 0. Then, after eA and
eB are chosen at date 1, any player can make the renegotiation offer with
some side-payments to the other players such that the authorities over both
projects are re-allocated to the manager.19 Given the authorities over both
projects, the manager will choose a = b = C after the renegotiation. This
leads to the following interim total surplus:
P (eA)q + P (eB)q − [P (eA)h+ P (eB)h]. (41)
Agent n (n = A,B) then obtains the following renegotiation payoff:
UDRn (en, ek) ≡ α[P (eA) + P (eB)](q − h) + P (en)h, (42)
which is the sum of α fraction of the renegotiation surplus and his status
quo payoff P (en)h from decentralization. Anticipating this renegotiation
outcome, agent n will choose en to maximize URn (en, ek)− c(en). The equi-
librium level of human capital is thus given by
eDR ≡ φ(αq + (1− α)h). (43)
19Since lump-sum side payments represent redistribution of the return among the three
parties without any incentive effects, we ignore side-payments in our analyses.
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Thus the total ex ante expected payoffs are
V RD ≡ 2{P (eDR)q − c(eDR)}. (44)
Next, suppose hierarchical delegation was chosen at date 0 where the
manager has the authority over project A and agent A has the authority over
project B. If renegotiation breaks down at the interim stage, the manager
obtains the expected payoff (1/2)P (eA)(h + q), agent A, (1/2)P (eA)(h +
q), and agent B, nothing.20 As in decentralization, potential benefits of
renegotiation can be realized if the authorities over both projects are re-
allocated to the manager. Then agent A’s renegotiation payoff is
UHRA (eA, eB) ≡ α{P (eA)q+P (eB)q−P (eA)(h+ q)}+
1
2
P (eA)(h+ q), (45)
which is the sum of α fraction of the renegotiation surplus [P (eA)+P (eA)]q−
P (eA)(h+ q)] and his status quo payoff (1/2)P (eA)(h+ q) from hierarchical
delegation. On the other hand, agent B obtains the renegotiation payoff:
UHRB (eB, eA) ≡ α{[P (eA) + P (eB)]q − P (eA)(h+ q)}. (46)
Thus agents choose eA and eB to maximize UHRA (eA, eB) − c(eA) and
UHRB (eB, eA) − c(eB), respectively. The equilibrium levels of human capital
are then given by
eA = eHR ≡ φ
(
1
2
q +
(
1
2
− α
)
h
)
, (47)
eB = eHR ≡ φ(αq). (48)
Thus the total ex ante expected payoffs are
V RH ≡ P (eHR)q − c(eHR) + P (eHR)q − c(eHR). (49)
Since there are no benefits from renegotiation when centralization was
chosen at date 0, the total payoffs remain the same as before: VC = 2{P (ec)q−
c(ec)} where ec = φ((1/2)q). Then we can show the following.
Proposition 8. Suppose φ′′ ≤ 021 and that renegotiation is possible af-
ter the investments in human capital are made but before the project-specific
decisions are made. Then hierarchical delegation is never optimal. If h > 0
is small enough, then centralization becomes optimal; otherwise, decentral-
ization becomes optimal.
Proof. See Appendix.
20Note that we are assuming hc = qs = 0.
21The quadratic example we studied before satisfies φ′′ ≤ 0. With P (e) = ηe and
c(e) = (γ/2)e2, we have φ′′ = 0.
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6 Conclusion
This paper has studied internal organization of a firm using an incomplete
contracting approach a` la Grossman-Hart-Moore and Aghion-Tirole. The
two key ingredients of our model are externalities among tasks that require
coordination, and investment in task-specific human capital. The return
from each task is shared between the relevant parties through ex post bar-
gaining. This is due to our assumption on contracting technology: in the
absence of complete, binding contracts, the return is shared between the
party with decision authority and the party with necessary human capital.
Depending on how the decision authority over each task is allocated, we have
compared three types of organizational structures: centralization where the
decision authority for all tasks is given to the party without task-specific hu-
man capital, decentralization where the decision authority for each task is
given to the party with necessary human capital, and hierarchical delegation
where the decision authority is allocated in a hierarchical fashion.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. Centralization can
coordinate the externalities, hence becomes optimal when the externalities
and the requisite coordination are the main issue in organization design.
The downside is that, compared to decentralization, centralization leads to
reduced incentives to invest in human capital. Decentralization becomes
optimal if the provision of incentives for investment in human capital is the
central issue. However, decentralization fails to coordinate the externalities.
Hierarchical delegation is optimal in the intermediate case. It empowers the
agent at the middle tier of the hierarchy, who is given stronger incentives
to invest in human capital than in centralization and to coordinate the
externalities to some extent. On the other hand, the incentive to invest
in human capital is the weakest for the agent at the bottom tier of the
hierarchy.
We have also discussed several directions where the basic model is ex-
tended. The first is related to the optimal pattern of hierarchical delega-
tion, which concerns who should be at the middle tier of the hierarchy. If
the agents are asymmetric in their ability, then the agent who is more effi-
cient and better motivated through empowerment should be at the middle
tier of the hierarchy. If the externalities are one-sided, then the beneficiary
rather than the benefactor has to be at the middle tier of the hierarchy.
Second, our results are shown to be robust to an alternative bargaining so-
lution such as the Shapley value. Third, we have confirmed the folklore that
managers’ limited expertise is a necessary condition for hierarchical organi-
zations. With unlimited expertise, a hierarchical organization is dominated
by the one where the authority is concentrated. Finally, we have considered
alternative timing of the game and introduced the possibility of renegotia-
tion. It was shown that hierarchical delegation is again dominated by other
organizational structures. Thus the case for hierarchical delegation is weak-
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ened if either of the agents has unlimited expertise or there is a possibility
of renegotiation before decisions are made.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
First, suppose the manager chooses a = b = C in equilibrium. Then agent
n (n = A,B) chooses en to maximize his expected payoff:
1
2
P (en)(hc + qc)− c(en).
By the definition of ec, the above expected payoff is maximized when en = ec.
Given eA = eB = ec, the manager optimally chooses a = b = C to maximize
her expected payoff:
1
2
P (ec)(h(a) + q(b)) +
1
2
P (ec)(h(b) + q(a)).
This is due to Assumption 1 (ii). Thus, a = b = C and eA = eB = ec
constitute an equilibrium in centralization.
Next, we will show that no other equilibria exist. Suppose that there
exists an equilibrium in which eA 6= eB. For this to be possible in equilib-
rium, it must be that a 6= b. Otherwise, a = b leads to eA = eB. Without
loss of generality, suppose that a = S and b = C. Then agent A chooses eA
to maximize
1
2
P (eA)(hs + qc)− c(eA),
which leads to:
eA = e ≡ φ
(
1
2
(hs + qc)
)
.
Similarly, agent B chooses eB to maximize
1
2
P (eB)(hc + qs)− c(eB),
which leads to:
eB = e ≡ φ
(
1
2
(hc + qs)
)
.
Given eA = e and eB = e, the manager chooses a and b to maximize
1
2
P (e)[h(a) + q(b)] +
1
2
P (e)[h(b) + q(a)].
The assumed choice of a = S, rather than a = C, is optimal for the manager
if and only if
P (e)hs + P (e)qs ≥ P (e)hc + P (e)qc,
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which is equivalent to P (e)∆h ≥ P (e)∆q. But this contradicts condition
(*). Thus, no asymmetric equilibria exist.
Finally, at any symmetric equilibrium with eA = eB, it must be that
a = b = C by Assumption 1 (ii). Thus the equilibrium we derived is a
unique equilibrium under centralization. Q.E.D.
7.2 Proof of Lemma
We will first show that there exists an equilibrium in which both agents
choose ec and a = b = C. Given eB = ec and a = C, agent A chooses eA
and b to maximize his expected payoff:
(1/2)P (eA)(hc + q(b)) + (1/2)P (ec)(h(b) + qc)− c(eA).
Thus b = C is optimal for agent A if and only if P (eA)∆q ≥ P (ec)∆h.
Agent A’s expected payoff is then
(1/2){P (eA)(hc + qc) + P (ec)(hc + qc)} − c(eA) if P (eA)∆q ≥ P (ec)∆h,
(1/2){P (eA)(hc + qs) + P (ec)(hs + qc)} − c(eA) if P (eA)∆q < P (ec)∆h.
Under condition (*), we have P (e)∆q > P (e)∆h > P (ec)∆h since e ≡
φ((1/2)(hs + qc)) > ec ≡ φ((1/2)(hc + qc)). Note also that e maximizes
(1/2)P (e)(hc+ qs)− c(e). Thus, eA = ec and b = C are optimal for agent A
given eB = ec and a = C.
Next, we will show that no other equilibria exist under condition (*).
Suppose first that there exists an equilibrium in which agent A chooses e′A
and b = S while agent B chooses e′B and a = C. Then agent A obtains the
equilibrium expected payoff:
(1/2){P (e′A)(hc + qs) + P (e′B)(hs + qc)} − c(e′A),
and agent B obtains
(1/2){P (e′A)(hc + qs) + P (e′B)(hs + qc)} − c(e′B).
Since agent B could have chosen eB = e and a = C given e′A and b = S, we
must have e′B = e because e maximizes (1/2)P (e)(hs + qc)− c(e). Also, for
agent A to choose b = S, we must have P (e′A)∆q ≤ P (e′B)∆h. Combining
these with condition (*), we must have
e′A < e ≡ φ((1/2)(hc + qs)).
Consider now agent A’s deviation such that, given eB = e and a = C, he
chooses eA = e and b = C. Such a deviation gives agent A a higher expected
payoff than in the assumed equilibrium since
(1/2){P (e)(hc + qc) + P (e)(hc + qc)} − c(e)
> (1/2){P (e)(hc + qs) + P (e)(hs + qc)} − c(e)
> (1/2){P (e′A)(hc + qs) + P (e)(hs + qc)} − c(e′A),
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where the first inequality follows from condition (*), and the second inequal-
ity is due to e′A < e and the fact that e maximizes (1/2)P (e)(hc+ qs)− c(e).
Suppose now that there exists an equilibrium with a = b = S and
(e′′A, e
′′
B). For this to be optimal for each agent, we must have P (e
′′
A)∆q ≤
P (e′′B)∆h and P (e
′′
B)∆q ≤ P (e′′A)∆h. The first inequality implies e′′A < e′′B
since ∆q > ∆h. Similarly, the second inequality implies e′′B < e
′′
A, a contra-
diction. Combining all the above, we can conclude that the equilibrium we
derived is a unique one. Q.E.D.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Since the two agents are symmetric, we will, without loss of generality,
assume that agent A is the middle agent. Clearly it is optimal for the
manager to choose a = S.
Next, given a = S and eB, agent A chooses b and eA, to maximize
1
2
P (eA){hs + q(b)}+ 12P (eB){h(b) + qs} − c(eA).
The optimal choice of eA is thus given by
1
2
P ′(eA){hs + q(b)} = c′(eA).
When b = C, agent A will choose eA = e. The optimal decision b is given
by b = C if and only if
P (eA)qc + P (eB)hc ≥ P (eA)qs + P (eB)hs,
which is equivalent to P (eA)∆q ≥ P (eB)∆h.
We now show that there exists an equilibrium in which agent A chooses
b = C and eA = e while agent B chooses e. Given eA = e and b = C, agent
B’s expected payoff is
1
2
P (eB){hc + qs} − c(eB).
Thus agent B optimally chooses e.
Let e∗ be the level of human capital satisfying P (e∗)∆q = P (e)∆h.
Then, given eB = e, agent A will choose b = C if and only if eA ≥ e∗
because b ∈ {S,C} should be chosen to maximize the relevant part of his
expected payoff, P (eA)q(b) + P (e)h(b).
Thus, given eB = e and a = S, agent A’s expected payoff can be written
as max{U c(eA), U s(eA)} where
U c(eA) ≡ 12P (eA)(hs + qc)− c(eA) +
1
2
P (e)(hc + qs) ∀ eA ≥ e∗
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and
U s(eA) ≡ 12P (eA)(hs + qs)− c(eA) +
1
2
P (e)(hs + qs) ∀ eA < e∗.
Note that U c(e∗) = U s(e∗) by the definition of e∗ and U c(eA) ≥ (<) U s(eA)
for eA ≥ (<) e∗. Note also that e∗ < e due to ∆q > ∆h and P ′ > 0.
Moreover we have e∗ < e < eˆ where eˆ ≡ φ((1/2)(hs+qs)) = argmax U s(eA).
Since e ≡ φ((1/2)(hs + qc)) maximizes U c(eA) and e > eˆ > e > e∗, we have
U c(e) > U c(eˆ)
> U s(eˆ)
> U s(eA) ∀ eA < e∗.
Since eA < e∗ must hold if it is optimal for agent A to choose b = S, the
above inequality shows that agent A optimally chooses b = C and eA = e.
Next we will show that no other equilibria exist. Suppose that there
exists an equilibrium in which agent A chooses b = S and e′A while agent B
chooses e′B. For b = S to be optimal for agent A, it must be that P (e
′
A)∆q ≤
P (e′B)∆h. Also, given a = b = S, agent B maximizes his expected payoff
(1/2)P (eB)(hs + qs)− c(eB) by choosing e′B = eˆ ≡ φ((1/2)(hs + qs)). How-
ever, given e′B = eˆ, agent A can increase his expected payoff by choosing
b = C and eA = eˆ rather than the assumed b = S and e′A. This is because
1
2
P (eˆ)(hs + qc)− c(eˆ) + 12P (eˆ)(hc + qs)
>
1
2
P (eˆ)(hs + qs)− c(eˆ) + 12P (eˆ)(hs + qs)
>
1
2
P (e′A)(hs + qs)− c(e′A) +
1
2
P (eˆ)(hs + qs)
for all e′A satisfying P (e
′
A)∆q ≤ P (eˆ)∆h, where the first inequality is due to
Assumption 1 (i) and the second inequality follows from the definition of eˆ.
Thus there does not exist an equilibrium with b = S. Q.E.D.
7.4 Proof of Proposition 3
(i) Fix all other parameters except qc. First, note that VD is independent of
qc. Second, VC is strictly increasing in qc since
dVC
dqc
= 2
{
P (ec) + [P ′(ec)(hc + qc)− c′(ec)]de
c
dqc
}
= 2
{
P (ec) + c′(ec)
dec
dqc
}
> 0
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due to P ′(ec)(hc + qc) = 2c′(ec) and dec/dqc = (1/2)φ′((1/2)(hc + qc)) > 0.
Moreover we have
lim
qc→∞
VC = 2
[
2P (E)
(
c′(E)
P ′(E)
)
− c(E)
]
= +∞
because c′(E) = +∞, P ′(E) < +∞, and limqc→∞ ec = E. Thus we
have VC > VD for large enough qc. Note also that condition (*) is still
satisfied for large qc because limqc→∞ P (φ((1/2)(hs + qc)))∆h < ∆h <
limqc→∞ P (φ((1/2)(hc + qs)))∆q = +∞.
(ii) Since hc + qc = hc + qs + ∆q and hs + qs = hc + qs + ∆h, we have
ec → φ((1/2)(hc + qs + ∆h)) and ed → φ(hc + qs + ∆h) if ∆q → ∆h.
Thus ed > ec holds in the limit as ∆q → ∆h. Also we have VC →
2{P (ec)(hc + qs +∆h) − c(ec)} and VD → 2{P (ed)(hc + qs +∆h) − c(ed)}
as ∆q → ∆h. Thus we have VD > VC when ∆q → ∆h because ed 6= ec and
ed maximizes P (e)(hc + qs +∆h)− c(e) over e.
(iii) Take the limit as ∆q → 0 and ∆h → 0. Fixing hs + qs = K for
some K > 0, all ec, e and e converge to φ((1/2)K). However, we have
ed → φ(K) even when ∆q → 0 and ∆h → 0. Thus we have VD =
2{P (φ(K))K − c(φ(K))} > VH = VC = 2{P (φ((1/2)K))K − c(φ((1/2)K))}
when ∆q → 0 and ∆h→ 0. Q.E.D.
7.5 Proof of Proposition 4
We will vary the value of q > 0 while fixing all other parameter values.
First, at q = h+2qs, we have e = φ((1/2)(h+q)) = φ((1/2)(2h+2qs)) =
φ(h+ qs) = ed. Thus, at q = h+ 2qs,
VH = P (e)(h+ q)− c(e) + P (e)qs − c(e)
= P (ed)2(h+ qs)− c(ed) + P (e)qs − c(e)
> 2{P (ed)(h+ qs)− c(ed)}+ P (e)qs − c(e)
= VD + {P (e)qs − c(e)}
> VD.
In the above, the last inequality follows from:
P (e)qs − c(e) > P (e)(1/2)qs − c(e)
= max
e
P (e)(1/2)qs − c(e)
≥ P (0)(1/2)qs
> 0.
Second, at q = h + 2qs, we have ec = φ((1/2)q) = φ((1/2)(h + 2qs)) =
φ((1/2)h + qs) < φ(h + qs) = ed for all qs > 0, and VC = 2{P (ec)(h +
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2qs)− c(ec)}. Since ed uniquely maximizes P (e)(h+ qs)− c(e) and ed 6= ec
at q = h+ 2qs, we obtain, at q = h+ 2qs,
VD ' 2{P (ed)h− c(ed)} > VC ' 2{P (ec)h− c(ec)}
when qs > 0 is small enough.
Third, since P ′(e)(1/2)(h + q) = c′(e) and de/dq = (1/2)φ′((1/2)(h +
q)) > 0, we have
dVH
dq
= P (e) + c′(e)
de
dq
> 0.
Similarly, we have
dVC
dq
= 2
{
P (ec) + c′(ec)
dec
dq
}
> 0.
Finally, since h/P (φ((1/2)qs)+qs ≤ h+2qs when h > 0 is sufficiently small,
condition (*) holds for all q ≥ h+ 2qs if h > 0 is small enough.
Summarizing the above argument, we can conclude that, for h > 0 and
qs small enough, there exists an interval (q, q) such that, for all q ∈ (q, q),
we have VH > max{VC , VD} while satisfying condition (*).22 Q.E.D.
7.6 Proof of Proposition 5
Let en and en denote the levels of human capital defined as: en ≡ φn((1/2)
(hs+ qc)), en ≡ φn((1/2)(hc+ qs)). Since φn is increasing, we have en > en.
Let ψn be a function of e, defined as: ψn(e) ≡ 2Pn(e)(c′n(e)/P ′n(e))− cn(e).
Then, by using hs + qc = 2c′n(en)/P ′n(en), hc + qs = 2c′n(en)/P ′n(en), the
total expected payoffs in hierarchical delegation with agent n at the middle
tier (thus agent j 6= n is at the bottom tier) can be written as
V nH ≡ P (en)(hs + qc) + P (ek)(hc + qs)− c(en)− c(ek)
= ψn(en) + ψj(ej)
= ψn(φn((1/2)(hs + qc))) + ψj(φj((1/2)(hc + qs))).
Using the above and ψ′n = 2Pn(c′n/P ′n)′+ c′n, φ′n = 1/(c′n/P ′n)′, we then have
V nH − V jH =
∫ (1/2)(hs+qc)
(1/2)(hc+qs)
{
ψ′nφ
′
n(x)− ψ′jφ′j(x)
}
dx
=
∫ (1/2)(hs+qc)
(1/2)(hc+qs)
{2Pn(φn(x)) + c′n(φn(x))φ′n(x)
− 2Pj(φj(x))− c′j(φj(x))φ′j(x)}dx.
From the above follows the proposition. Q.E.D.
22Here q = +∞ can be the case if VH > VC holds for all q ≥ h+ 2qs.
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7.7 Proof of Proposition 6
We will show V AH > V
B
H for all hc ∈ [0, hs]. Let F (hc) denote V AH as a function
of hc. First we will show F (0) > V BH . Next we will show F
′(hc) > 0. This
proves our claim since V BH is independent of hc.
To show F (0) > V BH , we can derive the following inequalities:
V AH =
{
1
2
P (e′A)(hs + qc) +
1
2
P (e′B)hc − c(e′A)
}
+
{
1
2
P (e′B)hc − c(e′B)
}
+
1
2
P (e′A)(hs + qc)
= max
eA
{
1
2
P (eA)(hs + qc) +
1
2
P (e′B)hc − c(eA)
}
+ max
eB
{
1
2
P (eB)hc − c(eB)
}
+
1
2
P (e′A)(hs + qc)
≥
{
1
2
P (e˜A)(hs + qc) +
1
2
P (e′B)hc − c(e˜A)
}
+
{
1
2
P (e˜B)hc − c(e˜B)
}
+
1
2
P (e′A)(hs + qc)
≥
{
1
2
P (e˜A)(hs + qc) +
1
2
P (e′B)hc − c(e˜A)
}
+
{
1
2
P (e˜B)hc − c(e˜B)
}
+
1
2
P (e˜A)(hs + qc)
≡ Vˆ
where the first inequality follows from the definition of e′A and e
′
B, and the
second inequality is due to e′A ≥ e˜A. Then straightforward algebra shows
Vˆ − V BH = P (e˜A)∆q − P (e˜B)∆h−
1
2
[
P (e˜B)− P (e′B)
]
hc.
which is positive if hc = 0 since e˜A > e˜B and ∆q > ∆h. Thus F (0) > V BH .
Next, differentiating F (hc) yields F ′(hc) = [P ′(e′B)hc − c′(e′B)]de
′
B
dhc
+
P (e′B) > 0 since (1/2)P
′(e′B)hc − c′(e′B) = 0 by the definition of e′B, hence
P ′(e′B)hc − c′(e′B) = c′(e′B) > 0. Q.E.D.
7.8 Proof of Proposition 7
We can derive the following inequalities:
VCD =
{
P (e˜A)(h(a˜) + q(b˜))− c(e˜A) + 12P (e˜B)(h(b˜) + q(a˜))
}
+
{
1
2
P (e˜B)(h(b˜) + q(a˜))− c(e˜B)
}
= max
a,b,eA
{
P (eA)(h(a) + q(b))− c(eA) + 12P (e˜B)(h(b) + q(a))
}
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+
{
1
2
P (e˜B)(h(b˜) + q(a˜))− c(e˜B)
}
≥ P (e)(h(S) + q(C))− c(e) + 1
2
P (e˜B)(h(C) + q(S))
+
{
1
2
P (e˜B)(h(b˜) + q(a˜))− c(e˜B)
}
≥ P (e)(hs + qc)− c(e) + 12P (e)(hc + qs)
+
{
1
2
P (e˜B)(h(b˜) + q(a˜))− c(e˜B)
}
= P (e)(hs + qc)− c(e) + 12P (e)(hc + qs)
+ max
eB
{
1
2
P (eB)(h(b˜) + q(a˜))− c(eB)
}
≥ P (e)(hs + qc)− c(e) + 12P (e)(hc + qs)
+
{
1
2
P (e)(h(b˜) + q(a˜))− c(e)
}
≥ P (e)(hs + qc)− c(e) + 12P (e)(hc + qs)
+
{
1
2
P (e)(hc + qs)− c(e)
}
= VH
where the second inequality follows from e˜B ≥ e and P ′ > 0, and the last
inequality from h(b˜) ≥ hc and q(a˜) ≥ qs. Thus concentrated delegation
dominates hierarchical delegation for any parameter values. Q.E.D.
7.9 Proof of Proposition 8
Fix all other parameter values but h. Let V RH (h) and V
R
D (h) denote V
R
H and
V RD as functions of h.
First, at h = 0, we have
VC = 2{P (φ((1/2)q))q − c(φ((1/2)q))
> 2{P (φ(αq))− c(φ(αq))}
= V RD (0)
since α < 1/2 and P (e)q− c(q) is increasing in e ∈ [0, φ(q)). Also, at h = 0,
we have
VC = 2{P (φ((1/2)q))q − c(φ((1/2)q))}
> P (φ((1/2)q))q − c(φ((1/2)q)) + P (φ(αq))q − c(φ(αq))
= V RH (0)
> 2{P (φ(αq))q − c(φ(αq))}
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= V RD (0).
Moreover we have
∂V RD
∂h
= 2{P ′(eDR)q − c′(eDR)}de
DR
dh
> 0,
∂V RH
∂h
= {P ′(eHR)q − c′(eHR)}de
HR
dh
> 0,
where we used the fact that P ′(e)q − c′(e) > 0 for all e ∈ [0, φ(q)). Finally,
at h = q, we have
V RH (q) = H(α) ≡ P (φ((1− α)q))q− c(φ((1− α)q)) + P (φ(αq))q− c(φ(αq)).
Note that H(1/2) = VC . Letting Γ(x) ≡ P (φ(x))q − c(φ(x)), we can show
dH
dα
= q{Γ′(αq)− Γ′((1− α)q)},
which is positive if φ′′ ≤ 0 because α < 1/2 and Γ′′(x) = [P ′′(φ(x))q −
c′′(φ(x))](φ′(x))2 + [P ′(φ(x))q − c′(φ(x))]φ′′(x) < 0 for any x < q. This
shows that H(α) < H(1/2) for all α ∈ (0, 1/2). Since H(1/2) = VC , we
then have V RH (q) = H(α) < VC .
Summarizing the above argument, we first obtained V RH (h) < VC for
all h ∈ (0, q). Thus hierarchical delegation is dominated by centralization.
Second, since VC is constant over h and V RD is increasing in h, there exists
a unique cutoff value h∗ such that VC > V RD for all h < h
∗, and V RD > VC
for all h > h∗.23 In addition, we need to satisfy assumption (**), which can
be rewritten as h ≤ (P (0)/P (E))q. Thus decentralization is optimal for all
h ∈ (h∗, (P (0)/P (E))q) if h∗ ≤ (P (0)/P (E))q holds. Otherwise, centraliza-
tion becomes optimal. Q.E.D.
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Table 1: Possible Organizational Structures 
 
 
Organizational structure Manager Agent A Agent B Note 
Centralization a, b       
Partial decentralization (A) b a   
Dominated by 
decentralization (Section 3.2) 
Partial decentralization (B) a  b  
Dominated by 
decentralization (Section 3.2) 
Decentralization   a b   
Cross-authority decentralization   b a 
Equivalent to centralization 
(Section 3.2) 
Hierarchical delegation (A) a b     
Hierarchical delegation (B) b   a   
Concentrated delegation (A)   a, b   
Dominates hierarchical 
delegation (Section 5.4) 
Concentrated delegation (B)     a, b 
Dominates hierarchical 
delegation (Section 5.4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Equilibria in Different Organizational Structures 
 
 
 
 Decision 
a 
Decision
b 
Human capital 
Ae  
Human capital 
Be  
 
Centralization 
 
C 
 
C 
 


 += )(
2
1
cc
c qhe φ  
 


 += )(
2
1
cc
c qhe φ  
 
 
Decentralization 
 
S 
 
S 
 
)( ss
d qhe += φ  
 
)( ss
d qhe += φ  
 
Hierarchical 
Delegation* 
 
S 
 
C 
 


 += )(
2
1
cs qhe φ  
 


 += )(
2
1
sc qhe φ  
* In hierarchical delegation, agent A is at the middle tier of the hierarchy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of Different Organizational Structures 
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